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FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THE
CREATION OF MACROECONOMIC RISKS
Abstract
We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan
contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk
allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case,
banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a workout of
banking crises, depositors receive non-contingent contracts with high interest
rates while entrepreneurs obtain loan contracts that demand a high
repayment in good times and little in bad times. As a result, the present
generation overinvests and banks create large macroeconomic risks for
future generations, even if the underlying risk is small or zero. This provides
a new justification for capital requirements.
JEL Classification: D41, E4, G2.









It is a widely held view that traditional contractual arrangements in banking leave
banks subject to the risks associated with systematic or macroeconomic1 shocks and
that this may be ineﬃcient. The recent ﬁnancial crisis in Asia renewed the attention
to the impact of macroeconomic risks on banks since a large number of banks became
insolvent. In this paper, we examine the incidence of macroeconomic risks in the
presence of ﬁnancial intermediation under diﬀerent regulatory schemes to solve banking
crises when banks can write deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic
events.
We consider an overlapping generations model in which ﬁnancial intermediaries such
as banks can alleviate agency problems in ﬁnancial contracting. Banks compete for
funds and oﬀer credit contracts to potential borrowers. We allow for macroeconomic
shocks aﬀecting the average productivity of investment projects.
We distinguish between workout and failure depending on whether the whole banking
system faces default. We show that ﬁnancial intermediation yields a Pareto eﬃcient
risk allocation for each generation if the regulator commits to bankruptcy or failure of
insolvent banks. If macroeconomic shocks are small, depositors and entrepreneurs are
oﬀered non-contingent deposit and loan contracts. All macroeconomic risk is borne
by entrepreneurs. The inside funds of entrepreneurs act as a buﬀer to macroeconomic
risks. If macroeconomic shocks are larger, banks write state contingent contracts for
both market sides and part of the macroeconomic risk is shifted to consumers, since
entrepreneurs cannot bear the entire risk.
The risk allocation changes completely if banking crises are worked out and, hence,
future generations provide funds to pay back the banks’ obligations to the previous
generation in order to prevent banks from becoming insolvent. Competing banks un-
der workout try to generate a proﬁtable (positive intermediation margin) and a non-
proﬁtable (negative intermediation margin) state of the world. In the good state with
high productivity of investment projects (upturn), they request high loan interests from
entrepreneurs in order to achieve a positive intermediation margin. In order to moti-
1 We use the terms systematic and macroeconomic shocks as synonyms.
2vate entrepreneurs to invest rather than to save, banks request very low repayments in
the bad state with low productivity of investment projects (downturn) which leads to a
negative intermediation margin. Deposit rates are non-contingent since banking crises
are worked out. Competition of banks for the creation of a proﬁtable state pushes
deposit rates up to the high repayment of entrepreneurs in the good state. As a result,
banks create a state of the world with high repayment obligations to depositors, but
very low pay-back requirements from entrepreneurs. The present generation receives
higher interest rates on savings than under bank failures. This induces overinvestment
of the current generation at the expense of future generations.
Allowing for equity issuing does not alleviate the incentives of banks to create proﬁtable
and non-proﬁtable states under the workout regime. In competition, banks are unable
to raise equity. Shareholders would demand at least the same expected returns on
equity as depositors receive. This is, however, infeasible since future generations pay
back deposits but not equity. Thus, a bank trying to issue equity cannot attract
savings. Capital adequacy rules are necessary to overcome the equity rising dilemma.
Our paper is related to recent discussions of regulatory issues regarding ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. First, our model can explain that competition of ﬁnancial intermediaries
under a workout regime increases the underlying aggregate risk, since banks compete
to create proﬁtable states of the world. While the usual regulatory discussion has fo-
cused on the behavior of single institutions (see Dewatripont and Tirole 1995) or on
the incidence of aggregate risk on the banking system without contingent contracts
(Blum and Hellwig 1995 and also Gehrig 1997), our model suggests that the usual
risk-taking incentives of bank managers must be complemented by the risk-generating
motive when banks compete with contingent deposit and loan contracts. Even if the
underlying productivity risk is small, competition of banks under a workout approach
yield large macroeconomic risks for future generations.
Second, it has been pointed out by Hellwig (1995a, 1998) that it is unclear why the
terms of the deposit contracts cannot be made contingent on aggregate events, such as
productivity shocks or ﬂuctuations in the gross domestic product. Hellwig [1998] oﬀers
three explanations of this phenomenon: lack of awareness, moral hazard of banks or
3deposit insurance, transaction costs and the market making role of ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries. Our model indicates that workouts of banking crises or explicit deposit insurance
will not lead to contingent deposit contracts but to contingent loan contracts with very
large diﬀerences in state dependent repayments. State dependent deposit contracts only
occur for large productivity shocks and a regulatory scheme that induces bankruptcy
of insolvent banks. Our analysis indicates that making deposit and loan contracts con-
tingent on variations in aggregate income under a workout approach is ineﬃcient and
should even be prevented by regulatory action.
Third, our model may explain why banks are unable or unwilling to raise suﬃcient
equity without capital adequacy requirements. Competition of banks in conjunction
with workouts of banking crises impedes the possibility of banks to raise equity. Capital
requirements are traditionally viewed as a form of prudential regulation that induce
banks to internalize the risk of their investment decisions. Our model provides a new
justiﬁcation of capital adequacy rules as they can be justiﬁed by the need to solve the
equity raising dilemma.2
Since we focus on stage contingent loan contracts, our analysis abstracts from many
other issues in the design of bank loan contracts which deliver unique characteristics
of bank loans. Recent work by Gorton and Kahn (2000) and Repullo and Suarez
(1988) and Hege (1997) has shown that unique characteristics of bank loans emerge
endogenously in bank/borrower relationships. While it will be important to take into
account bank loan design considerations in future work, the incentive to create macroe-
conomic risk is likely to remain if deposit and loan contracts can be conditioned on
macroeconomic events.
The model in the paper builds on the concepts how ﬁnancial intermediation with ad-
verse selection and moral hazard can be integrated into general equilibrium frameworks
as ﬁrst developed by Uhlig (1995) and extended by Gersbach (1999). The novel ele-
ments of this paper are the introduction and the examination of the impact of macroe-
conomic shocks in conjunction with state contingent deposit and loan contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In the third
2 Capital adequacy rules can solve equity raising problems, but may reinforce future macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations as shown by Blum and Hellwig 1995.
4section, we derive the equilibrium in the intermediation market when no macroeconomic
shocks are present. In section four we introduce temporary productivity shocks, state
contingent deposit and loan contracts and regulatory schemes. In section ﬁve and six,
we examine small and large productivity shocks under diﬀerent regulatory schemes. In
section seven, we consider the equity raising dilemma. Section eight concludes.
2 Model
We consider a standard overlapping generations (OG) model with ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation. Time is inﬁnite in the forward direction and is divided into periods indexed by
t. There are overlapping generations of agents living for two periods. For most of our
analyses, it will be suﬃcient to look at one particular generation. However, regulatory
policies such as workouts will require the existence of more than one generation.
Each generation consists of a continuum of agents, indexed by [0,1]. There are two
classes of agents in each generation. A fraction ´ of individuals are potential en-
trepreneurs. The rest 1 ¡ ´ of the population are consumers. Potential entrepreneurs
and consumers diﬀer in the fact that only the former have access to investment tech-
nologies. There is one physical good that can be used for consumption or investment.
The good is perishable. Each individual in each generation receives an endowment e
of the good when young, and none when old.
Each entrepreneur has access to a production project that converts time t goods into
time t+1 goods. The required funds for an investment project are F : = e+I. Hence,
an entrepreneur must borrow I units of the goods in order to undertake the investment
project. The class of entrepreneurs is not homogeneous. We assume that entrepreneurs
are indexed by a quality parameter q uniformly distributed on [qt¡1;qt], qt > 1, in the
population of entrepreneurs. If an entrepreneur of type q obtains additional resources
I and decides to invest, he realizes investment returns in the next period of:
q(I + e): (1)
qt is the aggregate indicator of the productivity of investment projects in period t.
5If qt is uncertain in period t ¡ 1, generation t ¡ 1 faces macroeconomic risk. For
simplicity, we assume that potential entrepreneurs are risk neutral and only care about
consumption when old, i.e. they do not consume when young. Consumers consume
in both periods. They have utility functions u(c1
t;c2
t) deﬁned over consumption in the
two periods where c1
t;c2
t are the consumption of the consumer born in period t when
young and old,respectively. Consumers are risk averse. If a household can transfer
wealth between the two periods at a riskless real interest rate, denoted by rt, the
solution of the household problem generates the saving function, denoted by sfrtg.
We follow the standard assumptions in the OG-literature that the substitution eﬀect
(weakly) dominates the income eﬀect, i.e. savings are a weakly increasing function of
the interest rate. We drop the time index whenever convenient.
Depositors face the following informational asymmetries. The quality q is known to
the entrepreneur, but not to depositors. Moreover, depositors cannot verify if an
entrepreneur invests (see Gersbach and Uhlig 1997). To alleviate such agency problems
in ﬁnancial contracting, ﬁnancial intermediation can act as delegated monitoring in the
sense of Diamond (1984).3 We assume that there are banks, indexed by j, that can
ﬁnance entrepreneurs. For all of our arguments, it will be suﬃcient that two banks
exist and compete.
As delegated monitors, banks act as information producers about private investment
projects. Banks have access to monitoring technologies by screening applicants in order
to assess their credit worthiness when contracts are negotiated as well as by interim
or ex post monitoring when entrepreneurs execute their investment projects or in the
case they default.
Since we focus on the impact of macroeconomic shocks on banks and GDP, we assume
that banks can completely alleviate agency problems in contracting.4 This is equivalent
to the assumption that monitoring outlays for a bank per credit contract is negligible.
Our analysis, however, carries over to the case where banks can completely alleviate
agency problems in contracting by investing a ﬁxed amount per credit contract in
3 A succinct discussion about the underlying frictions in markets that lead to intermediation can be
found in Hellwig [1994].
4 See also Williamson [1986, 1987], for general equilibrium models with ﬁnancial intermediation in
which costly monitoring alleviates agency problems.
6monitoring. In this case, the interest rate spread will be positive and will cover in
equilibrium the costs of monitoring. For simplicity of presentation, we assume in this
paper that such ﬁxed monitoring costs are zero.
Next, we discuss the nature of contracts oﬀered by banks indexed by j = 1;2;¢¢¢.
Bank j can sign deposit contracts D(rd
j) where 1 + rd
j is the repayment oﬀered for 1
unit of resources. Loan contracts of bank j are denoted by C(rc
j) where 1 + rc
j is the
repayment required from entrepreneurs for 1 unit of funds. Banks also require that
entrepreneurs must invest their endowments if they apply for loans. If macroeconomic
risk is present, we will allow for contracts to be conditioned on the realization of qt or
on the resulting GDP in period t ¡ 1. In such cases, state contingent deposit or loan
contracts can be written.
If banks can completely alleviate agency problems of entrepreneurs, only entrepreneurs
who want to invest will apply for credits. Note that generations save and invest inde-
pendently. Generations are only connected by ﬁnancial intermediaries which are the
sole long-living institution. A new generation is only aﬀected by the preceding genera-
tion if banks have accumulated either proﬁts or losses. In the former case, a generation
can buy the shares of the banks. Since we will focus on Bertrand competition and
proﬁts and therefore the price of bank shares will be zero in all circumstances, this
case is trivial and will be neglected. In the latter case, a generation may be forced by
regulation or may want to rescue banks by paying back the preceding depositors. This
will be the focus of our analysis. Losses of banks will only occur if aggregate risk is
present and hence there is uncertainty about qt.
73 Equilibrium without Macroeconomic Shocks
It is useful for the understanding of the results later in the paper to start with the case
of no macroeconomic shocks. We treat each generation and each intermediation game
separately. We will discuss at the end of the section in which cases this assumption
restricts the set of equilibria.
We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium in the intermediation market in each period. For sim-
plicity of exposition, we assume that two banks are present. Obviously, deposit and
loan contracts will have a length of one period since no transformation of maturities
needs to take place. We examine the following intermediation game.
Period t
1. Banks oﬀer deposit contracts to consumers and entrepreneurs.
2. Banks oﬀer credit contracts to entrepreneurs.
3. Consumers and entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Resources are
exchanged.
Period t + 1
4. Entrepreneurs pay back. Banks pay back depositors.
In the following we discuss the main assumptions of the intermediation game. We ﬁrst
assume that banks cannot ration deposit contracts in stage 3.5 Loans are obviously
constrained by the amount of deposits obtained. We ﬁrst consider the loan application
decision of an entrepreneur with quality q, given that he observes rd
j, rc
j of banks.
If he applies for a loan he also invests since banks can alleviate agency problems in
contracting completely. If he applies for a loan at the bank which oﬀers the lowest loan
rate, his terminal wealth or consumption W(q) will amount to
W(q) = q(e + I) ¡ I(1 + minfr
c
jg) (2)
5 This assumption coincides with current regulations in most countries. The assumption however,
appears crucial for all our results. It is unclear whether the equilibria survive if banks are allowed
to ration both market sides.
8If he does not apply, he obtains e(1 + maxfrd
jg) from saving his endowments. Thus,
there exists a critical quality parameter, denoted by q¤(rc
j; rd












so that entrepreneurs with q ¸ q¤ want to have loans while entrepreneurs with q < q¤
prefer to save. However, the decision whether to apply for loans or to save will also
depend on rationing expectations. We assume that entrepreneurs applying for a loan
at bank j and who are rationed, will go to the bank that oﬀers the most favorable
deposit contracts. There are three possibilities to formulate the rationing schemes and
expectations on the loan side.
First, under myopic or self-fulﬁlling no-rationing, entrepreneurs make loan application
decisions under the assumption that they will not be rationed at any bank. Under
this scheme all entrepreneurs applying for a credit go to the banks with the lowest
loan interest rate. Second, under simple rationing entrepreneurs take into account
that they may be rationed when applying for credits. Rejected entrepreneurs go to
the banks with the highest deposit interest rate and save. Third, under complex
rationing entrepreneurs apply ﬁrst for loans at the bank with the lowest loan rate.
If they are rejected they may try the second bank. If an entrepreneur who wants
to invest is rejected twice, he saves at the bank with the highest deposit rate. In
Gersbach (1999) it is shown that all three rationing schemes lead to the same perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which banks make zero proﬁts if no macroeconomic shocks
are present. In equilibrium, no rationing will occur. In order to explore the impact
of macroeconomic risk and the role of state contingent deposit and loan contracts,
we assume self-fulﬁlling rationing throughout the paper. This greatly simpliﬁes the
exposition. In all equilibria studied in the paper, the no-rationing expectations of
entrepreneurs are indeed self-fulﬁlling.
Since banks can induce investment decisions and thereby secure repayments, they
do not have to worry that low-quality entrepreneurs apply for loans since such en-
trepreneurs would have less consumption than with saving endowments. Hence, condi-
tional on granting a credit to an entrepreneur and receiving funds from savers, proﬁts
per credit of a bank j amount to:
9Gj = I(1 + r
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j) = I∆j (4)
∆j is the intermediation margin of bank j. In order to derive the intermediation
equilibrium, we assume that savings are never suﬃcient to fund all entrepreneurs.
Since the deposit rate rd
j cannot exceed ¯ q ¡ 1, and we have assumed that savings of
consumers are weakly increasing in the deposit rate, a suﬃcient condition is:
(1 ¡ ´)sf¯ q ¡ 1g < ´ I (5)
We also assume that investments exceed savings at zero deposit and loan interest rates.
In this case q¤ = 1 and, therefore, we assume
(1 ¡ ´)s[0] + ´ e
¡
1 ¡ (q ¡ 1)
¢
< ´ (q ¡ 1)I: (6)
The boundary conditions together ensure that savings and investment can be balanced
at positive interest rates. Finally, we assume that banks that cannot pay back go
bankrupt.6
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium with myopic or self-fulﬁlling rationing beliefs in















² entrepreneurs take optimal credit application and saving decisions under the ex-
pectations that they are not rationed,
² no bank has an incentive to oﬀer diﬀerent deposit or loan interest rates,
² no rationing occurs in equilibrium.
In the appendix it is shown:
6 As we will discuss later, the same equilibrium arises when a bank crisis is worked out.
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(ii) r¤ is determined by




¤ ¡ (¯ q ¡ 1)
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¤ = 1 + r
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Hence, the intermediation game yields the competitive outcome in which savings and
investments are balanced and in which there is a common interest for loans and de-
posits. For the purpose of this paper the important conclusion from proposition 1 is
that intermediation margins are zero in equilibrium and savings and investments are
balanced. The reason why two-sided price competition of banks yields the Walrasian
outcome is caused by the switching possibilities of entrepreneurs.7 Suppose that a bank
oﬀers a deposit rate slightly above r¤ in order to attract all depositors. If this bank
raises rc in order to exploit its monopoly power with entrepreneurs, a portion of en-
trepreneurs will switch market sides in order to save their endowments. This, however,
will cause large excess resources for the deviating bank inducing a loss higher than
the excess returns from the remaining entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs
with projects whose returns are equal or above r will obtain funds and invest.
Aggregate income, denoted by y0
t, is given by:
y
0
t = e + ´(I + e) ¢




The ﬁrst term represents the aggregate endowment in period t. The second term
captures the output generated by investments in the last period. Note that banks do
7 See Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1997) for the innovative theory of two-sided intermediation and
Gehrig (1997) for a recent extension to diﬀerentiated bank services.
11not need to put up equity to perform their intermediary function since they can fully
diversify their lending activities.
4 Temporary Productivity Shocks, Contracts and
Regulation Schemes
In this section, we consider the possibility of aggregate productivity shocks. We assume
that q¿ = q in all periods ¿ except period t. In period t, ¯ qt will be ¯ q1 with probability
p (state 1) and the productivity parameter will be ¯ q2 with probability 1 ¡ p (state 2).
The distribution of the entrepreneurs’ qualities varies accordingly. We assume ¯ q2 < ¯ q1.
z = ¯ q1¡¯ q2 denotes the size of the shock. ¯ qe = p¢¯ q1+(1¡p)¯ q2 is the average productivity
of the best possible qualities. We maintain the assumptions that savings and investment
can be balanced at positive interest rates for any of the following constellations. Since
these assumptions are a routine adjustment of the boundary considerations in the last
section we abstain from an explicit repetition of the conditions.
Equilibria of the intermediation game in period t¡1 will now crucially depend on the
regulator’s approach towards banking crises. A banking crisis occurs when one or both
banks and thus the whole banking system cannot pay back depositors. We distinguish
between working out and failure when banking crises occur. If the regulator commits to
failure, banks that cannot pay back go bankrupt. If the regulator commits to working
out, he will tax future generations to pay back existing obligations.
The exact regulatory policy for working out banking crises are irrelevant for the inter-
mediation game in period t and for our purpose. The only assumption is that, under
working out, banks expect that losses will be fully recovered in the future. If banks do
not make losses in period t, they expect zero proﬁts in the future because of Bertrand
competition. If banks make losses in period t, banks expect that losses are recovered
in future periods and no proﬁts occur either.
While we compare the consequences of two regulatory schemes with commitment to-
ward banking crises, our analysis can also be discussed in the following terms. Sup-
pose that the young generation can determine the regulatory approach toward banking
12crises. If the costs to establish a new banking system after the failure of the existing one
are negligible, the young generation would always choose failure in case of a banking
crisis. If those costs are prohibitively high and must be born by the young generation,
a banking crisis would be worked out.
With stochastic aggregate productivity shocks, banks can oﬀer state contingent con-
tracts in period t¡1. We denote by C(rc1
j ;rc2
j ) the credit contract oﬀered by bank j. rc1
j
and rc2
j denote the interest rate demanded from borrowers in state 1 and state 2 respec-
tively. Similarly, D(rd1
j ;rd2
j ) denote deposit contracts with deposit rates rd1
j and rd2
j ,
depending on the realization of macroeconomic shocks. We maintain the assumption
that banks are risk neutral.8
Since consumers are risk averse, they prefer a riskless interest over a lottery frd1
j ;rd2
j g
with the same expected interest rate. We assume that consumers intertemporal pref-
erences and their attitudes towards risk generate the saving function, now denoted by
sfrd1
j ;rd2




the expected interest rate on loans is given by rce
j = prc1
j + (1 ¡ p)rc2
j .
An entrepreneur is characterized by his quality in the good state, q, or by his average
quality, denoted by qe, and given by:
q
e = p ¢ q + (1 ¡ p)(q ¡ z) (8)




j ). An entrepreneur with
an expected quality qe and associated quality q in the good state faces the following
choices. Applying for a credit yields expected wealth:
E(W(q)) = p
©












Note that in the bad state, the project returns may be insuﬃcient to pay back credit
obligations. Saving funds yields expected wealth
8 Since entrepreneurs as owners of banks are risk neutral, the assumption follows naturally. If en-
trepreneurs were risk averse, there exists various justiﬁcations of the “as-if-risk-neutrality” assump-










= e(1 + r
de
j )
Since potential entrepreneurs are risk neutral, the comparison of the expected wealth
between investing and saving determines the critical quality level above which en-
trepreneurs invest. In the following, we examine the intermediation game in period
t ¡ 1, depending on the size of the shock.
5 Small Productivity Shocks
We ﬁrst consider the case when shocks are so small that funded and investing en-
trepreneurs are always able to pay back. The upper limit for small shocks will be given
in the next proposition. In this case, the critical entrepreneur in terms of expected
quality, would be given by:
q






such that entrepreneurs with qe ¸ qe¤ apply for loans while entrepreneurs with qe < qe¤
save their endowments. Note that qe¤ implies a critical value in the good state, denoted
by q¤, and deﬁned by:
q
e¤ = pq
¤ + (1 ¡ p)(q
¤ ¡ z)
We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium when the regulator commits to failure. In the case
of failure, depositors know that banks can never pay back a promised deposit rate





j . For instance, if rd1
j > rc1
j were oﬀered, depositors
would simply count with rd1
j = rc1
j . Conditional on receiving funds and granting a
credit to an entrepreneur, expected proﬁts per credit of bank j amount to:















The critical entrepreneur is denoted by qe¤
f . We obtain:
14Proposition 2
Suppose that the regulator commits to failure. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium




where rf is determined by:






























f = 1 + r
f
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that the interest rates, the critical en-
trepreneur and the upper bound of the shock are fully determined by the exogenous
variables. The proposition implies that ﬁnancial intermediation with commitment to
failure of the regulator yields a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of risks for the generation
under consideration. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs can bear the entire macroeconomic
risk since they can repay the same interest rate in both states. The productivity shock
is fully absorbed by the ﬂuctuation of the entrepreneurs’ income. Banks never default
in equilibrium.
Suppose, however, the regulator commits to workouts. In this case, banks might be
tempted to request particularly high interests rates on loans in the good state while
they request low interest rates in the bad state. It is instructive to show ﬁrst that the
eﬃcient risk allocation within a generation can no longer be an equilibrium.
Proposition 3
Suppose that the regulator commits to workouts. Then, eﬃcient risk allocation cannot
be an equilibrium.
15The proof is given in the appendix. In the next proposition we establish the equilibrium
of the game. The critical entrepreneur who is indiﬀerent between saving and applying
for a loan in the case of workouts is denoted by qe¤
w .
Proposition 4
Suppose (qe¡1¡p)e+(qe¡2p)I · 0. Suppose that the regulator commits to workouts.














(iii) rw is determined by
(1 ¡ ´) ¢ sfr
w; r














w = 1 +
Ifprw ¡ (1 ¡ p)g + erw
e + I
The proof is given in the appendix. Under workout, banks want to create a proﬁtable
state while they are not concerned about losses in the other state. Competition drives
proﬁts in the good state to zero and we have rc1
j = rd1
j . In order to demand high interest
rates from entrepreneurs in one state, banks do not require any repayment in the bad
state in order to motivate them to apply for loans and not for saving. The condition
in proposition 4 is fulﬁlled, as long as the expected upper level of the productivity is
not too high and the probability that the good state occurs is not too low.9
Proposition 4 holds independent of the size of the shock as long as qe fulﬁlls the
condition. Thus, even if the macroeconomic risk is small, future generations face large
9 If the condition in proposition 4 is not fulﬁlled, the results remain qualitatively the same. Banks will
still demand less repayment in the bad state from entrepreneurs. However, rc2
j = ¡1 is no longer
feasible in equilibrium since the average loan interest rate would induce too much investment.
16aggregate risks. Proposition 4 holds even if there is no macroeconomic risk at all, i.e.
¯ q2 = ¯ q1. This case, however, can only occur if there are sunspot random variables
which have the probability distribution (p;1¡p) and on which banks write contingent
deposit and loan contracts. An immediate corollary of 4 is:
Proposition 5
Suppose (qe¡1¡p)e+(qe¡2p)I · 0. Suppose that the regulator commits to workouts.
In the bad state future generations face a negative spread of 1+rw and losses equal to
the savings of the last generation.
Obviously, propositions 4 and 5 are extreme since banks can write contracts with
entrepreneurs demanding negative interest rates in one state of the world. If we restrict
the set of contracts to non-negative interest rates, our results are qualitatively the same,
but the potential losses for future generations shrink. Future generations face a negative
spread equal to the interest rates on savings and losses are equal to the interest income
of the current generation.
In the next proposition, we compare the interest rates and investment levels under
both regulatory schemes.
Proposition 6
The comparison between workout and failure yields:









w < 1 +
I rf + erf
e + I




17Hence, using proposition 2, we obtain:
(1 ¡ ´)sfr
f;r











The strict inequality is reinforced if we lower rf to rw in sfrw;rwg since savings weakly
increase if the real interest rate rises. This is, however, a contradiction to the savings
and investment balance in the workout case and hence we obtain rw > rf. Moreover,
rw > rf implies that qe¤
w < qe¤
f in order to balance savings and investments.
As proposition 6 describes, under the workout regime the current generation overinvests
compared to the bank failure regime and depositors receive attractive interest rates.
Since entrepreneurs do not need to pay back in one state of the world under workout, a
larger share of entrepreneurs invests instead of saving, compared to the failure regime.10
6 Big Productivity Shocks and Bank Failure
In this section, we complete our analysis with the case when the shock is suﬃciently
large so that complete insurance of savers is not possible under the failure regime. The
essential condition is that the wealth of entrepreneurs is insuﬃcient to insure depositors,
i.e. z ¸
e(1+rf)
p(e+I) , where rf is determined by proposition 2. We obtain:
Proposition 7
Suppose that the regulator commits to failure and that z >
e(1+rf)
p(e+I) . Then, there exists















10 To prevent the overinvestment result, the regulator could ﬁx deposit rates from the beginning at
the level rf. Such ex ante deposit rate ceiling would, however, not eliminate the risk generation





I(1 + r2) + (e + I) fzp ¡ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)r2g
p(e + I)
(iv) r2 is determined by


















f = 1 + pr
1 + (1 ¡ p)r
2 =
I (1 + r2)
e + I
+ zp
Hence, banks oﬀer state contingent deposit and loan contracts. Part of the macroe-
conomic risk is shifted to depositors. The risk allocation among the agents of the
generation under consideration is eﬃcient under the regulatory scheme which prevents
the aggregate risk from being shifted to future generations. Note that there is space for
further improvements in risk allocation by repackaging deposit contracts into two secu-
rities. One very risky contract to risk-neutral entrepreneurs who save. One less risky
or even riskless contract for risk-averse consumers. Such ﬁner contract arrangements
would further improve the risk allocation. They yield, however, the same conclusions
since the amount of aggregate risk shifted to savers remains the same.
7 Raising Equity and Capital Requirements
Until now, banks did not need to put up any capital to perform intermediation. On
the one hand, banks could completely diversify idiosyncratic risks. On the other hand,
banks could write state contingent deposit and loan contracts or could shift aggregate
risk to future generations. In this section, we allow banks to raise equity. Under failure
there is clearly no need to raise equity since the competition of banks shifts aggregate
risk to entrepreneurs and consumers anyway.
Suppose that banks can additionally oﬀer equity contracts in case of workouts. An
equity contract speciﬁes that the holder will either receive a proportional part of a
bank’s proﬁt as a dividend in the next period or in case of default will receive nothing.
We obtain:
19Proposition 8
Suppose that (qe ¡ 1 ¡ p)e + (qe ¡ 2p)I · 0. Suppose that the regulator commits to
workouts. Then, banks cannot successfully oﬀer equity contracts in equilibrium.
Proof :
Consider the equilibrium without equity contracts, described in proposition 4, with
deposit contracts rd1
j = rd2
j = rw that insure consumers. Moreover, rc1
j = rw and
rc2
j = ¡1. Suppose that a bank wants to oﬀer equity contracts. Consumers or non-
investing entrepreneurs would only apply for such contracts if the average repayment
is at least 1 + rw. Loan contracts are limited by the requirement that the average
repayment cannot exceed p(1 + rw)I. Otherwise, entrepreneurs would not apply for
such contracts. Hence, the return on equity in the good state cannot exceed 1+rw since
demanding a higher loan rate in this state would imply a larger expected repayment
than p(1+rw)I. Therefore, the bank must oﬀer a return on equity in the bad state of
1+rw as well in order to attract savers. But since repayments by creditors are bounded
above by p(1 + rw)I, the bank cannot secure repayment of 1 + rw per unit of loan in
the bad state as well. In summary, in one state of the world the return on equity will
be below 1 + rw while the return on equity in the other state of the world is at most
1+rw. Hence, banks cannot oﬀer equity contracts with expected returns at least equal
to 1 + rw. Thus, no bank can oﬀer successfully equity contracts.
The preceding proposition illustrates that competition in conjunction with workouts
of ﬁnancial crises impedes the possibilities of banks to raise equity. Hence, regula-
tory requirements that banks must hold equity in a certain proportion to outstanding
loans alone can induce banks to raise equity and can decrease the incentives to cre-
ate proﬁtable and non-proﬁtable states and reduces the costs of workouts. Capital
requirements are traditionally viewed as a form of prudential regulation which induces
banks to internalize the risk of their investment decisions. Our model provides a new
justiﬁcation of capital adequacy rules since they can be justiﬁed by the need to solve
the equity raising dilemma. It is, however, clear that the issue of capital adequacy
rules is much more complex than the brief account we can oﬀer in this section.
208 Conclusions and Extensions
We have examined the incidence of macroeconomic shocks in a model of ﬁnancial in-
termediation under diﬀerent regulatory schemes towards banking crises. The current
framework should allow a number of potentially useful extensions. For instance, if the
regulatory agency can commit to a particular regulatory scheme, the decision whether
or not to rescue insolvent banks would depend on the majority voting in a particular
period. It is obvious that there are conﬂicting interests about the appropriate regu-
latory scheme. A generation will always vote to introduce regulatory actions in order
for working banking crises and to distribute negative productivity shocks across future
generations if such productivity shocks occur when it is old. A young generation will
suﬀer if they must work out banking crises and pay back the depositors. Hence, regu-
latory schemes depend strongly on the relative sizes of subsequent generations and on
potential costs to set up new banks. The political economy of regulatory schemes and
the induced impulse responses to shocks could provide useful insights into the timing
of bank failures and workouts.
Our analysis points out that the combination of allowing banks to fail and contingent
deposit and loan contracts yields an eﬃcient risk and investment allocation. However,
there is a large number of further issues to be taken into account in banking regu-
lation outlined in the surveys with diﬀerent emphasis by Bhattacharya and Thakor
(1993), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1994), Freixas and Rochet (1997),
Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998), and Allen and Santomero (1998). How an
overall second-best banking regulation scheme should be designed remains open.
219 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
We ﬁrst show the existence of the equilibrium. We note that r¤ is uniquely determined.
The boundary conditions ensure that at least one solution exists. For suﬃciently high
interest rates investments become zero and hence the left side of the equation for r¤ is
greater than the right side. For r¤ = 0 the boundary condition ensures that the right
side is greater than the left side. Hence, since both sides are continuous in r by the
mean value theorem at least one solution exists.
Moreover, the left side of the implicit equation for r¤ in proposition 1 is monotonically
increasing in r¤. In contrast, the right side is decreasing in r¤. Hence, the solution is
unique.
Loan application decisions of entrepreneurs are optimal, given rd = rc = r¤. Proﬁts of
banks per credit contract are zero (see Equ. (4)).
Changing one interest rate while leaving the other at r¤ is never proﬁtable for a bank.
Consider a change of rd
j. Either proﬁts are negative if rd
j < r¤ or a deviating bank
obtains no resources. Consider a change of rc
j. Either proﬁts are negative since the
interest rate margin is negative or the deviating bank does not obtain loan applicants
and will make negative proﬁts because of our rationing assumption.
Suppose, however, bank j oﬀers slightly better conditions for depositors (rd
j = r¤ + ²)
and tries to exploit its monopoly power on the lending side, i.e., the bank changes both
interest rates.
Since bank j would obtain all deposits, overall proﬁts, denoted by ¼j depending on its
choice rc
j amount to:
¼j = ´(¯ q ¡ q
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j is negative if q · 2.
Hence, proﬁts are decreasing for rc
j ¸ r¤ + ² in the loan interest rate. Thus, bank j
cannot make proﬁts by oﬀering rd
j = r¤ +² and some lending rate rc
j ¸ r¤ +². Finally,
it is obvious that setting rd
j = r¤ + " and rc
j < r¤ + " is not proﬁtable because proﬁts
are negative.
Uniqueness follows through similar observations. Any interest rate constellation which
would yield excess resources can be improved by a deviating bank. Any interest rate
constellation with rd < rc and no excess resources cannot be an equilibrium either. A
bank can proﬁtably deviate by setting rd + ", (" > 0) and rc ¡ ±, (± > 0) where ± has
to be selected so that no excess resources occur.
Proof of proposition 2:
We observe that for given rce
j and rde
j , and hence a given critical entrepreneur qe¤ and
a given proﬁt per credit, banks can oﬀer risk averse depositors the highest utility by
23setting rd1
j = rd2




banks are forced to oﬀer rce
j = rde
j . Raising rde
j slightly and increasing rce
j to obtain
monopoly proﬁts from entrepreneurs is not proﬁtable for the same reasons as outlined














This equilibrium interest rate is denoted by rf and determined by the saving and
investment balance. Finally, we need to verify that banks are able to pay back in both
states of the world. Otherwise, their deposit rates would not be credible. In the bad
state the repayment condition is given by
(q
¤ ¡ z)(e + I) = (q
e¤ ¡ zp)(e + I) ¸ I (1 + r
f)




Proof of proposition 3:














±(p ¡ 1) + prf
p
where ± is larger than ². Bank j would obtain all deposits since rde
j > rf. The critical
entrepreneur amounts to
q
e¤ = 1 +
Irf + e(rf + ²)
e + I









j bank j will not be able to pay back depositors in the ﬁrst state.
24Since, however, banking crises are worked out, expected bank proﬁts per credit amount
to
E(Gj) = (1 ¡ p) ¢ I(± ¡ ²) (13)
For suﬃciently small ², excess resources from depositors are negligible. However, for
± > ² and ± suﬃciently large, expected proﬁts are large. Hence, the proﬁtable deviation
of bank j destroys the existence of the eﬃcient risk allocation equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 4:
We ﬁrst observe that rw is uniquely determined. The left side of the implicit equation
for rw in proposition 4 is increasing in rw since sfrw; rwg and qe¤
w are monotonically
increasing in rw. In contrast, the right side is decreasing in rw. The corresponding
boundary conditions ensure that a unique solution exists.






w + ² (14)
r
c2
j = ¡1 (15)
The bank would obtain all resources and would try to maximize expected proﬁts by
choosing the monopoly interest rate rc1
j . Expected proﬁts are given by
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(17)
Note that we have used rc1
j = rw = 0 and " = 0 to obtain the inequality. Hence, under
the assumption in the proposition the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Proof of proposition 7:
a) In the bad state the interest rate r2 in (iii) is determined by the requirement that
the critical entrepreneur can just pay back. We must have
(q




e = pq + (1 ¡ p)(q ¡ z)
which implies for the critical quality levels qe¤ = pq¤ + (1 ¡ p)(q¤ ¡ z)
q
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I (1 + r2) + (e + I)fzp ¡ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)r2g
p(e + I)
which corresponds to (iii). (v) follows by solving equation (19) for qe¤.
b) For suﬃciently large productivity shocks we always have r1 > r2.
Using (iii), r1 > r2 implies
p(e + I)r
2 < p(e + I)r
1 = I(1 + r
2) + (e + I)
©
zp ¡ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)r
2ª
er
2 < I + (e + I)(zp ¡ 1)
(20)
For a given r2, qe¤ is increasing in z. Hence, in order to fulﬁll the savings/investment
balance in (iv) an increase in z leads to a decline in r2. Hence, for suﬃciently
high z, equation (20) will be fulﬁlled.
c) Expected proﬁts of banks are zero. However, we have to consider possible devi-
ations. Suppose bank j oﬀers deposit interest rates r1 and r2 + ². Since bank
j obtains all deposits, it could change the individually optimal interest rates on
loans. In order to avoid the excess resource problem bank j needs to make sure
that enough entrepreneurs want to apply for credits. Hence qe should not raise
above qe¤ = 1 + pr1 + (1 ¡ p)r2.
From
q
e¤ = 1 +
I rce + e ¢
³
pr1 + (1 ¡ p)(r2 + ²)
´
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